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fibstTttCt.. TLis paper establishes in the simplest possible way optimal rules for cap-
ital income and profits taxatiou in thc open economy with or without foreign ownership
of ciomestic. firnls. We show that if there aze constraints ou the feasibility of profits
taxatiou, both saviug and IllV(`StII1CIIt taJCCS gcucrally cnter the optimal tax pac:kage. If
insteací profits can be fully t.uced, then source-based investmeut taxes vanish. If domestic
firms are in pazt owned by foreigners, then source-based investuleut taxes can be used to
shift income away from these to domestic citizeus and they may even be used to finance
lump snm transfers to doulestic resideuts.l
~ Comments from R.obin Boadway, Kaare Hagen, Mick Keeu, Jack Míntz, J. Pe-
ter Neazy, Agnar Sandmo, Guttorm Schjelclerup and Peter Bircll Serensen aze grate-
fully acknowledged. The activities of EPRU :ue financed by a graut from The Danish
National Research Foundation. Correspondeuce to S~ren Bo Nielsen, EPRU, Copen-
hagen Business School, Nansensgade 19, 5., DK-1366 Copenhagen K, Denmark; e-mail:
sbn~ecoC~cbs.dk1. Introduction
This papcr characterizes the optimal taxatiou of capital incolne alld profits in a small
open economy. The optimal saving and investment tax rates, in particular, are related
to the degree of foreign owncrship of domestic firms and to the extent to which a profits
tax is feasiblc. Wc show that, a goverrunent optimally does not apply a source-based tax
on investment or capital~ if profita call be fully taxcd. An invc~stnx;nt tax is, however,
generally part of the optimal tax package in the absence of complete profits taxation. The
uptimal investment tax ratc if positive is shown to decline with the feasible rate of profits
taxation. At the same time, a higher foreign ownerahip of dolnestic firms increases the
scope for the investment tax, if profits are not completely taxed.
The previous literature (see, for example Gordon (1986, p. 1096), Frenkel et al. (1991)
allcí Bruce (1992)) finds that slutill countries optimally cío not apply source-based invest-
ment taxes. This finding can be seen as an application of the Dialnond-Mirrlees (1971)
principle of striving for production efficiency. Frenkel et al. (1991, p. 103) note that "the
necessary conditions for the attainment of this result is that all commodities (including
labour) alld all profits and rents be taxable; in particular, depending on the government's
budgetary neecís thcse profits and rents may be fully taxed away." Giovannini (1989, p.
367), Apel and Dillén (1994, p.2), alld Huizinga (1995) similarly statc that neither the
pure source nor the pure resi(lence principle of capital income taxation is optimal if profits
cannot be fillly taxed. Apel alld Dillén (1994) specifically examine the merits of the polar
cases of the resicicnce alld source principles in a multi-country setting, when profits can be
taxed fully, not at a.ll, or at thc salnc ratc as intcrest. This papcr explicitly investigatcs
how the optimal mix of residence :uI(1 aourcc level capital inc,ome tuxes depends on the
fe:~sibility of profits taxatiou .uld also on the foreigu ownership of domestic firms. The
fcasiblc ra.te of profits taxation is givcn exogcucously, or it may bc constrained to equal
the ratr, Of lI1VC8tII1CIlt taxiltlOn.
The paper is organized a.v follows. Section 2 describes the two period model of a small
open economy. Section 3 cícrivcs the, optimal source- and residence-based capital income
tax rates for the caLSC whe,rc firuts :uc fillly owned by the c.ouutry's owu residellts. Section
4 instcacl cunsicicrs thc iutplicatiol)s for optimal capital incomc tax policy if a country's
firlus arc in part ownccí by forcign residents. In this instance, luutp suln transfers from the
government to a country's rc~sidcnts nlay well be part of the optimal tax scheme. Section
5 preseuts sume comparativc atatics results and discusses how th(~ optimal tax scheme is
affecte.d, if a country effectively can tax output and savings, alld if a country for whatever
t According Lo Lhe source principle, a tax is levied where the íncome originxtc~, while according to the
residence principle lhe income is txxed where it is received.
TrPeseet by .t,t,t.s-~)Xz
rcason cannot tax the foreigu source income of its residents. Sectiou 6 concludes.
2. The model
The modcl iu several ways extcncís the work iu Huiziuga (1cJcJ5).1 We consider a two
period urodel of a sltLall opeu cconotny that is fiuancially well iutegrated with the rest of
the world. The domestic interest rate equals the exogenously given world interest rate, r.
In the first period, the representativc domestic agent receives au cudowme.nt of the single
good denoted Y. Thesc resources are divided between first period consumption, Cr, and
savíng, S. The economy's firais invest K in the first period. This investment is productive
only in thc second period. For uow, cíomestic. firrns are assiuuecí to be owned fillly by
domestic citi~ens. ht section 4 we introduce the foreign ownerslup of domestic firlns.
Thc govcrnment requires second period revenues equal to G. Govcrnment revenues are
spent entirely on goods that do not directly affect private utility or production (think of
this, for example, as defense expenditure). The government has three tax instruments at
its disposal in the second period: a tax on the returns to saving at a rate t,,, a tax on the
rcturns to investment or capital at a rate tk, ancí a profits tax at a rate z.3
Firrn.,r
Firms produce output equal to F(K) units in the second period. The production func-
tion F is assumed to be strictly concave. Given the world rate of intcrest and the taxation
of capital, the user cost of capital is (1 f ~ rrt )K.4 After-tax profits of firms amount to
(1 - z)[F(K) -(1 -} ~-rk )K]. We here assume that the investment tax is deductible from
the profits tax. In actual tax systems, profit-líke taxes may lIlstCad 1)c deductible froxn
investment-like taxes. The maxilnization of these profits on the part of firms yields that
the capital stock is given by,




The two period budget constraint of households can be stated .r.ti follows,
Cs-(Y-cr)[lfr(1-ta)lf(1-z)[F(K)-(lf 1-tk)K]
~Huizinga (1995) does not consider the taxation of profits or the foreign ownership oC domestic firms
in thc small open economy.
3We ignore forcign taxes on any foreign suppliers of capital. Similarly, foreign suppliers of capital do
no receive a foreign tax crediL at the margin for domestic investment taxes.
~With this rental price of capital, the investor receives a return after depn.r.iation and investment
taxation (but beforc a possible savings tax) c~ual to the international intere~t rate.Houscholds iu~iximizc a lifc timc utilit.y dcuutcd by U(C, , Ct ). TLc first order conditiou
rcgarding thc intertcniporrrl consumptiou choicc iti as follows,
U~ - U2[1 -F r(1 - t,)]
The governm,ent
Tlic governmcnt's secoud period tax revenues have to be at least equal to government
vpending, G, as follows,
0 C G c trrS ~- I tk~tk K~- z[F(K) -(1 } I r tk )h ]
(2.3)
The two capital incornc taxes, tk, and t„ are both lcvied on the return to capital.
Alternatively, we crm define a tax on saving at a rate u- rt.,, rutcí a t.uc on investment at
a rate v - rtk~(1 - tk). In the analysis below, it will be convenieut to characterize optimal
tax policy first in terms of thcae direct taxes on saving ancí on investauent. The tax revenue
from the direct taxes on saving and on investmcnt cqual uS a.nd vií, respectively.s
Finally, we assume that the profits tax rate, z, caiinot exceed its maximum z, i.e. z G z.
The maximum profits tax rate, i, in turn canuot exceed one.
SNote that t„ - u~r, while tk - v~(r } v).3. The optimal taxation of capital and rent
The gOVeiIlIIICIIt wishes to tnaximire the utility of the representative domestic agent
subject to its minimun2 rcrverme requirement. The optimal tax problem is one of choosing
thc tax rates z, u and v so as to maximize the following Lagrangcan expression,e
L - U(Ci, (Y - Ci )(1 }- r - u) -F [F(It) - (1 f r t v)K](1 - z))
-}- a(uS f vlí t z[F(K) -(1 f r-} v)K] - G) f F~(z - z)
Let us first look at thc dcrivative of the Lagraugca22 with respect to the profits tax ratc
z,
aL - [F(x) - (1 trf „)x](a - Ul) - ,~ - o (a.l)
~z
The L.tgrallgc multiplier ~ in (3.1) caz2 be iltterplrted as the marginal cost of public
fimds mcasured in terms of prívate utility, while U2, of course, is the marginal utility of
scconcl pcriod cousutnption.
The profits tax, z, cle~u'ly is non-distortionru~y. If revemtes {I'OIII this tax are sufficient
to covc~r all govcrmucnt t.uc rcvcmtc nc.r,ds with z ~ z, then thc L:Igrangc IIlnltlphcr ~t
iu (3.1) will bc icro. Thc In:trginrtl cost of public fimcís in thc sccond period, a, thcn
equals the Inarginal utility of consunlptiou iu thc sazne period. If revexntes froln the profits
tax by themselves are insuHicient to wver the entire governlnent revenue ncr.d, then z
will bc sct cqual to its mrLximum value, z. In this instauce, the Lagrange multiplier Ei
is positive, allcí oue or botL of the capital iucoule taxes u and v will be utilized. These
taxes are distortionary, which implies that the marginal cost of public filnds, a, exceeds
the marginal utility of second period consumption, Ut.
The optitnal siie of the saving allcl invest.~netlt ttix rates, u ~uI(l v, cal2 be found :Ls
follows. First, we can differentiate the Lagrattgean with respect to the tax rate u to get,
-Ul f a(1 - ue„) - (l (3.2)
where wc havc introduccd e„ --~u ~S.
Similarly, cíiffcrentiatiou of expression (3.1) with respect to v yielcls,
Uz[-(1 - z)] f ~[(1 - z)(1 f uP) - e~v] - ~
6We otx5crve, withouL explicitly indicating so in Lhe oxpreasion, Lhat consumption, saving and invest-
ment are all implicit functions of Lax raLcw. Moreover, we invoke the first order conditions (2.1) and (2.2)
in Lhe following.whcrc c„ --`~~k ~h attd wharc p cícnutcs thc houscholds' profx:nsity to consnme in thc
first pcriod out of sacotxl pcriod incotnc.~
After coinbiuiug (3.2) attcl (3.3), we obtain tlic following relationship between the tax
rates u atxl v,
a[u(1 - z)(c„ -F p) - e„v] - 0
Sincc a is posítivc, this equation caat bc solvcd for v to yicld,
c'u ~- P v-(1-z)u
Cv
(3.4)
From equatious (2.3) aitc~ (3.4) we can solve for the two tax rates u and v for a given
lirofits txx ratc, z, .~,ti follows,"
u -
:utd,
c„S f (1 - z)~(e„ -~ p)lí (G
- x(F(h) -( 1 f r)lí]) (3.5)
v- (1 - z)(cx f P) (G - z[F(K) -(1 i- r)hJ) (3.6)
e„S ~ (1 - z)1(c„ -}- p)K
Recalling the definitions of u and v, we catt solve for the tax rates t„ and tk as follows,
and,
t' - c„S -t (1 - z)1(eu f P)h
(G - z[F(h ) - (1 f r) ]) (3.7)
(i - z)(e,a f P)(G -~[F(h) -(i tr)Kl ) 3 s
tk -(1 - z)(cu i- P)(G - z[F(K) -(1 ~- r)K]) f rc„S f r(1 - z)~(c„ f- p)K (~ )
From thc abovc fornnilas wc sec that thc investtnent tax ratc, tk, tnoves towards zero
and that the saving tax rate, t.., converges to (G - z(F(K) -(1 f r)K])~(Sr), as the profits
tax rate, z, approaches one. We now cait state the folllowing results,
PROPOSITION 1. A govcrnment that c:azL tax profits fully nc~vcr optimally institutes
a sourcc-lrtscd tax on investtncut. A govcrnmcnt that is restricted iu tlu: usc of thc profitti
71n deriving (:1.'l) xud (:4.a), wo r~ee LhxL K dcpencls on v, while .S de{muds un boLh u and v. The tenn
(1 - z)up in (3.1) is rv{ual Lo (i)S~Uv)(u~K). "Co see Lhis, note Lhxt an increa.ur in v hy one uniL will lower
ucond period incorne by K(1 - z). '1'his IcacJs to a rise in saving equal to pK(I - z)~(1 f r- u), where
p-(l f r- u)p is the propensity to consume out of (irgt period income.
BFor expositional purposes we assume in what followx thaL c„ ~ p ~ 0, precluding the saving and
inve~sLrnent laxec from turning into subsidies. The reacler may wish to explore the consequences of e„ t p
becornirtg ncgxtive. Notc LhxL if r„ t p- ~, Lhen optimxlly v- 0. Thie mcans that the polar caae of juaL
sxving txxxtiou rxn lu~ optimal, ovou if the .remi-cla.tic~ity c„ ir finite, and z is IexK than unity.
L' o
r,,, r
htax, howevcr, geuerally applies llotlt source-ba5c~c1 ancl resicleuce-b:~tie~cl capital iucome taxes
if profits tax reveuues are iusttfficient by thentselves to satisfy thc govermnent revenue
nceds.
The results statr.d in the proposition are ilhtstratcd with the aid of figtlre 1. The curve
labellecl F(lí) represettts a concave productiou fimctiou. The liue denoted by (1 f r)K is
t.hc capitul rcutal cost to t.hc~ firnt. Profit utaximization on t.hc part of firtns implies that.
thcy maxituize the vcrtical dist:utcc hetweY~n thc~ two schedules, yielding att optimal capital
ock of Iíc~. With ï- 1, the ;~,vcrntnent cau obtain profits tax revenues equal to thc
firtn's cutirc llrofits indicated by thc liuc segtnent AB in figttre 1. If tkte goverument now
introduccs a positive investtnent tax at a rate v, then the capital rental schedule moves up
to the linc labcllec! (1 -{- r.{- v)K in thc figure. ln response, firnls optimetlly reduce the size
of the capitetl stock to K„ in the figure. Productiou tax revenues now consist of investment
tax revenucs equal to vK,,, Incasured by the line sc',gIItent CD, altcl of profits trix revenues
F(K„) -(1 f r ~- v)K,,, mca.tiured by the linc segntcnt DE. Thc sutu of these is given by
F(K„)-(1-~ r)K,,, a.ti inclicated by the line segment CE in the figum. A direct comparison
shows that total production tax revenues with att investtnent tax indicated by the distance
CE are less than rcvenues without an investntcnt tax indicated by the distance AB.
If ï G 1, then thc introduction of an investtucnt. tvc ntay well iucrcasc total tax revenucs
from productive activity. In figure 2, the govcrnntent crut again obtain production tax
revenucs cqual to AB in the abscnce of a.n investlnent tax. With a positive investment tax
equal to vc, the governntent insteací obtains total production tax revenues equal to CE,
which eviclently exceeds AB, even though the capital stock ha.5 been reduced frotn K~ to
K„~. Total production tax rcvenues, cqual to z[F(K) - (1 f r~- v)K] -} vK, thus calt be
enhanced by a positive valuc of the investtnent rate, v, if ï G 1. Iu essence, the investment
tax, v, generally is part of the optirnetl tax scheme with ï G 1, as this tax call be seen as
an indircct tax on firm profits.
The rclatiouship betwcen the optimal saving aud iuvestment tax rates itnplicit in equa-
tion (3.4) calt be exprassed in the fornt of a'wcighted average' rulc reminiscent of Aorst
(1980).~ Using thc defutitions of u and v, we calt restate equatiou (3.4) in ternts of the tax
rates t,, and tk a5 follows,
rtk
-(1 - z)(cd f p)rt.. f cv 1- t - 0
k
Adding the term ((1 - z)(c„ -} p) {- e„]r to both sicíes of thc ccluation yields,
T'
(1 - z)(cu i- p)r(1 - 1.r) f- e„ -~(1 - z)(cn f P) f cn]r
1-tk
9 We are indebteJ to Mick Kc~~n Cor suqy,exting thia formulxtion.7
Using cxpressiou (2.1) and defining r„ - r(1 - t„) to be tltc nct iuterest rate received
by savers, wc get,
or„f(1-a)(F'-1)-r (3.9)
wit.li,
(1 - z)(c„ -}. p)
-(1 - z)(c„ f p) i- P.,
o - (3.10)
In the above cxpression, thc iuterest rate, r, is written as a wcighted average of the
uct. intcrest ratc rcccivcci by savcrs, r,,, and thc ur.t marginal productivity of domcstic
capital, F' - 1, with wcights a aud 1- o, respcctively. With a stnall value of o, thc
uct interest rate, r,,, is rclativcly f.tr frotn r. In this instaztce, saviugs are taxed heavily
relative to investtnent. The weigltt o c:ut be scx~tt to depend on the saviugs aud investment
scmi-elasticitics, c„ attd c,,, ancl the lirofits tax rate, z.
4. The foreign ownership of ftrms
In this sectiou, we examiue the itnplications for optintal tax policy of the foreign owner-
ship of elontestic firnts, when there is forcign clirect itrvestmeut. A share a, with 0 G a G 1,
of dotncstic firms is asaumed to be owncd by forciguers. This is also thc share of after-tax
profits of cíomestic firnt.ti accruing to foreign citizens.~o Let T, with T ~ 0, be the size of
a guvernment trtutsfer, if .uiy, tn clomestic hou:~e,holds. The two-period houschold budget
constreunt can now bc writtcn a,ti follows,c~
Ct-(Y-C~)[1fr-u] f(1-z)(1-cr)[F(K)-(1-~rft,)K]f-T
The governtnent's finaticiug cottstsaittt in turn changes to,
G-~T-uS-t-i~Kfz[F(Fí)-(ltrfv)K]
Noting the nou-negativity of the treutsfer, T, we can write the Lagrangean as follows,
L- U(Cc,(Y - Ci )(1 f r- u) ~(1 - z)(1 - a)[F(K) -(1 f r -~ v)K] ~-T)
fa(uS-}irli 1-z[F(ti)-(lfrt„)lí]-G-T)-}-ti(s-z)~-vT
Again, lct u5 first cousidcr thc profits tax, z. With forcigu ownenhip of domestic firnts,
this tax iu psu~t scrvcs to tiltl{t lI1COln(' {rOI71 t.hc forcign owncrs uf cloutestic firms to thc
~~The lwo shares, of couru, niYecl nol bc lhe aarne.
rrThe rcawn for in6roducing lhe lurn~rsom transfer will become clear trclow.x
dotnestic govcrtunent. AS :t rctiitlt, we crut yhciw that thc profits t.uc, z, is optimally set
cqual to it5 tuaximtun va)ue, z. To this cucl, let us consider the dcriv~ative of the Lagrangeatt




If the profits tax, z, is set be.low z, then the Lagrattge multiplier Il associated with the
non-negativity constraint for trantifers, T, equetls icro. From (4.1), we sec~ that this implics




we scr,, howcver, that a ntust be at Icast as largc as Uz. This contradiction with the earlier
cyuality of 1- Ul(1 - a) cstablishcs thc followiug result,
PIiOP()SITION 2. With foreigu owncrsttip of dotncstic firnts, thc profits tax, z, is
optirually sct cqual to its liutit z, regardless of the governtrtent rr.vcuuc requiretnent, G.
With z- z, we cart obtain cxpressiotts for the two othcr capital income tax rates, u and
v, as follows. As before, we cíifferentiate the L:tgrangeart with respect to u and find,
-Ul t ~(1 - tte„) - 0 (3.2)
Sitnilarly, cíifferentiation of the Lagrattgian with respect to v yiclcls,
Uz(-(1 - a)(1 - z)) f~((1 - i)(1 f uP) - e„v) - 0 (4.3)
After cotnbitliug equatious (3.2) and (4.3) wc get,
~[u(p ~-(1 - n)c„) - c„v~(1 - z) f n] - 0
Noting that ~ is positivc, wc cau exprcaa v iu tcrtns of u as fo11ow5,
v - (1 - z)u(P } ( 1 - cY)c,.) f (1 - z)a
(4.4)
c„
Frotu cxpres,ion (4.4) íttl(í t11C frltiUl(7Ilg constraint we cart solve for the saving and
investmcut tax ratcs, ~t attcí v, as follows,12
t! - (G i-T - z[F(li) - (1 f r)lí])c„- (1 - z)llí~
(4.5)
r„S f( 1 - z)11í(p f(1 - o)e„)
~~Wc Icxvc thc Ïorrnula5 for l,, and tk to thc readcr.9
all(l,
(1 - z)[(G f T - z[F(K) - (1 ~ r)h ])(P f (1 - cr)c„ ) -F crS]
t) -
c~S f(1 - z)zK(P f (1 - n)c~ti)
(4.6)
Thcsr, expressions fur u íuxl v suggcst iuterior, positive solutious for these tax rates. In
sevcral catics, howcver, ouc or hoth of thcsc tax instrluucnts is optimally not used depending
in part on the sizc of the maxinlum prufits tax rcvenucs relative to the government revenue
requiremcnt. It is convenicnt to distinguish thc two cases wherc thc maximtlm profits tax
rate, i, is cqual to alld less th;ul 1.
Caer I: Complr.tr. profit.r taxatiou
If prufits call bc taxeá fully with z- 1, thcn thc sourcc-bavccl t:uc, v, is optimally sct
cqttal to icro as cau bc secn frotu cquatiotl (4.6). Rcgarciing thc uptiulal savings tax, u,
two caseti cíul be dist.iuguishccl clepcncling ou t.Le siic of the maxiulum profits tax revenues
rclative ta the govcrnent rcvenuc reqnirclnent, G. Fint, 1{ IIIaXIII113II1 t)I'ofit3 rCVCnues, given
by F(Ií )-(1 -~ r)K, excecd (or are equal to) thc required revelme G, then the differeuce
is returncd to cíomestic re:sicícuts in the {OIIIl U{ a 1llIIlp 9Um transfer, T. This irnplies that
T- F(Ií)-(1 f r)K - G~ 0. In th11 1I15tilI1('(:, the optimal savinq alld investment tax
ratcx, u iLL(1 t1, arc hoth cctual to zcro from (4.5) :uld (4.fi). Iu thc sccond ca~1c to considcr,
maxilmun profits tax rcvenucs, F(K) -(1 -F r)K, ]uc less thatl tllc govcrnnlcnt revenue
requiren]ent, G. Agaiu, ccltlatiuu (4.6) indicatcs that the optim;tl invcstaueut tax rate, v,
equals zero. As a consequcuce, t}le gOVC2'ílIIlellt W1II I'CS(1rt EO íl putiltdvl` HílVlll~., taX t0 IL(Y~t
its revelnle requirelneut. It iti straiglltforwarcl that the optimal saving ta~c, u, is given by
(G - F(lí)~- (1 ~- r)K)~S. With a positivc SaV1Ilg taX, the margiual cost of public funds
cxcecds the IIlarglIlál lltlhty of private consunlption. The optimal transfer, T, is thus set
eclual to reso.
Case II: Incomplctr. ptnfit.y taxation
Ncxt, wc cunsiclcr opt.imal t:uc puli('.y in thc c:4~sc of incolnplctc rcnt taxatiun with z G 1.
()ptilnality first requires that thc profits tax ratc, z, is sct cqual tu its maximum valuc,
z. Aqaiu, wc carl clistinguish twu c;L`;cti ou thc ba,is of thc sizc of I11iUC1ml1II1 profits tax
revcnues (at a zcro investnlcut tax), z(F(K)-(1 fr)lí), relativc to thc government revenuc
requirelnent, G.
(a) If tllc tnaxinnun rcvcnues from profith taxation, z[F(IC) -(1 ~ r)K], exceed the
guvernn]cnt rcvenuc recplirc]ncut, G, then thc hunp sum trallsfer, T, is at least equal to
thc diffcrcucc ~[F(lí) -(1 f r)li]- G. The question arises of whether it is of interest
to institute a pusitive I11VC8tIlleilt ta1C rate, u, so as to incrca.u~ the trallsfer, T, even
further. Thc :ulswcr is in thc afkinuative, because with v- 0, thc marginal national costto
of funds assocíatecí with this tax, cqual to Ul(1 - cr), will be less than the marginal utility
of consunTption, Uz. In essc~ncc, this argurnent reflects the fact that the investment tax
can be used to tralTfer resources from the forcigu owners of domestic firms to domestic
consumcrs. This argument does not apply to the saving tax, u, alTd therefore the optimal
saving tax cquals zero. With u- 0, thc optimal transfer, T, and thc optimal investment
tax, v, arc given as follows,
T - z[F(K) - (1 ~- r)K] ~- a(1 - z)lK~c„ - G (4.7)
and,
v - ce(1 - z)~e„ (4.8)
(b) Alternativcly, maximum profits tax revermes u~c less thalT thc goverlTment revenue
recluirc~Inent. By the sarnc logic as in case II(a), thc optlITla1 lIlvl`stIRent tax rate, v, is
at lcast cqual to cr(1 - z)~c,,. If at this valuc of v, total tax rcvcnucs from production
activity, i.c. z[F(K) -(1 f r~- v)Ií] t vlí, cxccr.d G, thcn thc surplus optimally is
paid out in the form of a tr.uTSfcr, T, to domestir. citizens. Iu that iustance, there is no
rationalc to institutc a positivc saving tax. If thcsc total tax rcvcuucs from production
activitics arc lesa th:LtT the revenuc requirement, however, thcn furthcr tax revenues by way
of distortionary taxes are necessary. This rcquires that the invcstmcnt tax, v is optimally
increasecí beyoncí a(1 - z)~c,,, while the saving tax, u, is optimally increased beyond zero.
In this iustance, the margimil Cost o{ pllbhC I'evenuCS is raised abovc the marginal utility
of private consumptiolT, which implies that trruTSfers, T, are optimally zcro.
This corupletes the characterization of optimal tax and transfar policy in the case of
forcign ownership of domestic firnTS. We calT sununarize the main insights as follows,
PROPOSITION 3. With partial foreign owuership of domestic firms, source-based
investn)ent. taxes are only part of the optirnal tax scheme if profits cannot be taxed fully.
Investrnent to-ix revcuucs may bc usccí to finar)ce lump sunT transfcrs to ciornestic citizens.
This occurs if with v- 0, z[F(K) -(1 ~- r)K[ is greater than or only slightly less than G.
A positive saving tax alTd positive tnarTSfers to the public cannot, however, coexist.
It is interesting to obscrvc that thc optimal tax schen)e implics thc following result,
COR.OLLARY. With incolnplete profits taxatiou and some foreign ownership of domes-
tic firms, the saving and invc.stment taxes will always be used to such au extent that,
G f T~ z[F(lí)- (1 f r)IC] (4.~)11
To conclude this section, note that a.ti before we call characterize optimal taxation by
way of a'weightcd average' formula. Analogously to the cíiscussion in section 3, we call
cíerivc,
ar„t(1-a)(F'-1)-r~-ry (4.10)
where a is as dcfined above and wherc,
cr(1 - z)(1 - e„Ie)
7- (1-z)(Pfcu)fe~
(4.11)
T11C paraIIlCter ry is positive, sincc e„ -} p is :i.tisumed positive, alxl e„u must be less than
one at the optimunl. The wcighted average fornulla suggests that r.etcris paribu~ a lugher
degrce of forcign owncrship lcads to a greater wcight on thc taxation of investment relativc
to the taxation of saving. The next. section clcmonstrates that this is indeed the case.
5. Ftirrther issues regarding tax policy
This section first preseuts some compal~ative statics results that relate the optimal saving
and investlnent tax rates to underlying modcl paralncters. Second, it examines the case
whcrc thc ratc of profits taxation is c.onstraineed to e,qu:sl the ratc, of investlnent taxation.
In this installce, the goverulnent cau effectively trix output allcl savings. To conclude,
the section cíiscusses the implications for optilnal tax policy of the uuenforceability of a
residential taxation of foreign source income.
Comparative atatics results
In this subsection, we consider how the optimeil capital income t~ix rates depend on key
model paralneters such a.5 the maxilnuln rent taac rate alld the e.xtent of foreign ownership
of domestic firms. We will ~ssiune that there is incolnplete rent taxation and partial foreign
ownership, i.e. 0 G a, z G 1. AS 1I1d1CatCd above, we can distinguish case II(a) with no
saving tax alld a positive trallsfer froln case II(b) with a positive saving tax and no transfer.
The comparative statics for thesc. two cases aue presentcd in turn. Throughout, we only
consider changes in parameters that are so snlall as to preclude a regilne change.
Case II(a~
In this casc, the optitnal tiLX policy 11I1phCS thC eX1titCI1('C of a positivc tr~msfer, T, a~s in
(4.7), a positive investment tax, v, as in (4.8) along with a zero saving tax, u. A highcr
foreign ownership share, n, first affects the investment tax, v, a.g follows,
l3v 1-zv ( ) (5.1)
íia - (e„v)[(F -~ 1)e„v -}- 1~I'l
whcre thc variabk; F is clc;fincd to bc thc (:1FL~L]Clty U{ t)1C ti(:COLl(1 (1Crivativc of thc production
fimction witlt rcapect to thc capita.l stock ag follows,
E - F,,,(h)h~I,c~(h )
We shall assumc that (e {- 1)r„v -} 1 7 0 so that thc cicriv.atc ~~á iu (5.1) is positive.13
A higher foreign ownership parame~ter, o, affects the tratlsfer to the public, T, as follows,
~ - K(1 - z)(1 - (Y)~ ~ (5.2)
which ,Lows that the transfer is qualitativcly affected in the salne way a4 the investment
tax ratc. This is what ouc (,xpecta given that thc initial investln(;Ilt tax rate is smaller
than consiateut with th(~ maxinuzation of total t,ix revenues from production activities.
Ncxt, lct us consider aIl incrcavc iu t11C IIlaXIITllln1 ratc of rcut taxation, z. First, notc
that such an incrca~sc~ cugcnclcrs a rcduction in thc ratc of invcstwcut. taix givcu by,
(~,1 -(VY,
(5.3)
t3z - r„v[(e f 1)r„v ~ 1]




A higher rate of profits tsixation directly yielcls Iuore tax reveuues .Lti inOicated by the
first terln on thc rigllt hancl siclc; of (5.4). At th(; ,alne tilue, it calls(w a fall in the revenuc
from investulent taxation, .LV refl(~cted in the I:,.vt term in (5.4). ()n h.Llance, the impact of
a highcr v:aluc of profits ta~cation, z, ou trallfcrs, T, is thcreforc 'rllllblguou5.
FlIlally, IlotC that an increaSf; ln t11C gOVCrmucnt revenue require.IneIlt G can be seen to
have no effect on the icrvestment tax rate. It thus leacls to a on~for-one fall in the transfer.
Ca.~r, II(6J
Wc uow cousiclcr ca5c II(b) whcm thcrc optilnally is a positivc savings tax, u, but
there are; no positive transfcrs, T. The governlnent buclget constraint alld the optimality
(~.ondition (4.4) call now be rcytated av follows,
G-uS-~ulí fz[F(Ií)-(l~r{-v)Iti] (5.5)
luuí,
vc„ - u(1 - z)Oi-~ (1 - cr)c„] ~- (1 - z)(r (5.6)
~~s, hae to Ix~ rather ~tongly n~~gativ~ t(, ~~óange tl~c .ign of the derivate. IL ~-an ca5ily be checkec), for
example, lhul the signs arc as titated fur any C;obfrUonglaa producLion structurc.I:i
Now wc can tutally rliffcrr~utiutc (J.J) to yir,lrl,
dG - [F(K) - (1 -}- r f v)K]dz f ( 1 - c„u)Sdu ~- [(1 - z) - c„v]Kdv
From the. above eqllatl()Il, we acx that az) incrca.x~ iu the governn)ent revenue. require-
IRCIlt, G, can be satisfiecl by :uI incrca.tic in either the saving tax, u, or the investment tax,
v. A lower profits trix rate, z, similarly can bc n)ct with an increslse in at least one of
the two c-apital iucomc tax rutcs, u and v. Equatiun (J.J) is representecl by the negativcly
slopcd GG schcdulc in figur(~ 3.
Next, we caI) totally differeutiate (5.6) to yielcl,
IEvdV - ILuljU ~ IL~,.(~(x - IdiflZ (J.7)
Wlth,





~6~ - 7([11 } ( 1 - (Y)('u - ( í - ~)(Vp
} (1 - (x)(7('u
)]
l7w ~w
Thc sculi-clasticity c„ clcpcIldS VIl tll(: 111Vt'SLIII('ut tax ratc, 1)ut not oII thc saving tax ratc,
u, and the parazneters (x alld z. The semi-c1.Ltiticity r.,, alld the cousumption propensity
p in contrast Inay vary with v, u, z.u)d a, a.v inclicatecí by thc r.xpressions for h,,, hu, h~
:uld h„ in (5.7). Let us atisulne that these dcpeudcnces do not preclucíe any of the four
coefficicnts fronl Lcing po,,itivr.. Thcn we cau rcpresent eqIIFLt10I1 (5.G) by the positively
sloped HH curve in figtlre 3. This ccuv(~ in essence inciicates optin)al colnbinations of the
capital )I1CbIne tax rates, u ancí v, for differcIlt gOVCrIlIIICIlt rCVCnuc requirements.
Again, WC W)Sh t0 CXiLIIlllle hOW tíle two capital 111COIIIC tax rates, u and v, are affected
by changes in (i) the cícRre~(~ of forcigu ownership, (x, in (ii) the maxill))un profits tax rate,
z, and in (iii) the governnlent revenue reqllircn)ent, G.
First, Ict us consicler a highcr forcign owucrsllip sharc, a, a.v illustrated in figure 4,
panel (a). This iucrease dcx~s not affect the position of the GG schccilile, but it moves the
HH schedule upwazds. The risc in cr thus causes aII iucrease in v, allcí a decrease in u.
Intuitively, a higher fore.ign ownership share provicíes the governmeut. with an incentive
to capture additional IIICOII)C from foreigners by way of a highcr investment tax, v. Asa result, the total tax revenues from production activity rise so that there is room for a
lowcr saving tax, u.
Next, let us consider arl incrcase iu the maxilnuln profits tax rate, z, as indicated in
figure 4, pallel (h). In the figurc, both the GG alld HH schedule.g move downwards, which
iult)lies that the investlncut tax rate falls, whilc the savings tax rate ulay either rise of fall.
Thc fall in thc iuvestment tax rate rcflects that there is Icss rc~Ltioll to use this tax as a
seconcí bcst tax on firm profits. Thc rise in the profits tax allcí the f.Ill in the investment
tax have opposite etfccts un ovcrall tsuc revcuu(s frolu prodllctiou activity. As a result, thc
induceci change iu the saviug tax rate, u, is aaubiguous.
Finally, let us cxalninc a higher government rcvenuc requirelncnt, G, with the aid of
figure 4, pancl (c). This incrc.LSe in G does not affect the HH schecíule, while it moves
t,lx~ GG ,chedulc upwards. As a reslllt, thc: 111V1:4tII1(:Ilt ~uld saviug tax rates both rise aw
lIl(hciltcll by t11C upwar(1 IIIUVCII1Cllt albIlg thC stationary HH schedulc.
V4c c:ul statc thc Iuaiu conlí)arativc staticti reslllts av follows,
PROPOSITION 4. A highcr foreign owncr,hip aharc Of d()IIl(:st](' ill'II1H l1IlaIRblgllouSly
leads to a rise, in the sourcc-ba.5ed investlnent tax rate if profits are uot fillly taxed. Trans-
fcrs, if positivc, also risc, whilc thc saviug tax falls, if positivc. A highcr profits tax ratc
lcads to a lowcr investment, ta, while thc effect on cither the size of trallsfers or the optimal
tiaVlIlg taX lti dSTlblguOlL~i.
Profit and invr..~tment tax rnte:e tied to,qether
Until uow we have assulnccl that thc cciliug on thc profit tax ratc, ti, is exogenously giveu
by ]IlYtltiltloIldí (:VIlstralnt5. IIl practice, it may be very difficult to (listinguish between
profits (or the return to e.ntrepreneurial labour services) azld thc ret.)u'n to capital. In this
installce, the governulcnt mxy be coustrained to tax profits and thc rctllrn to capital at au
equal rate. The taxeS OIl })1'Otlt9 ancl IIlVC8tIT1CIlE are then effectivcly rcplaced by a single tax
on output net of the capital expensc, i.c. F(K) - K. Replacing both tk and z by x, we see
that tax revenucs from prodactive activity are given by x(F(K) -(1 f i-s )K) -~ 1-~ K-
x(F(K) - K). In the following, wc; CUI131dC1' E11C situation where thc government taxes
output at the rate x aTld saving at thc rate u. Then the consolidatecí budget constraint of
houscholcls bcconles,
Cs-(Y-CI)Ili-r-u]t(1-~)IF(K)(1-x)-(ltr-x)K]fT
where F(lí )(1 - x) - K( I f r-x) stazlds for after-output-tax profits of domestic firms. As
in Section 4, a frac'tion cr of thesc profits ;ucruc to the foreign owners, if any, of domestic15




The government revenuc constraint changcs to,
(5.8)
OcGfT cuS-}-x[F(Ií)-K~ (5.9)
The sum of rrvenues from savings alld output taacation should be aufficient to cover the
governmcut rcvenuc requimtncut, G, plus (if rclc~vatlt) luulp sum trallsfcrs, T.
Following Section 4, we c.m now set up the optimal tax problem for the case where
only saving alld output taxes are available. Frotu the first order couclitions, we first learu
that the mazginal cost of public 5ulcls, a, optimally is at least :1-v l:uge as second periocí
nlargitir-1.1 utility, Ui. Furthcrluorc, thc output ancí saving tax ratcs arc rclated as follows,
u(p f (1 - cr)e„) ~- cx
x - (5.10)
I)(~x
where rl denotes the ratio uf uscr cost of capitxl to alfter-output-ta profits, rl - rIC~[(1 -
x)(F(K) - K)], ruld cr iti dcfiuccí by c~ --(t7A~c3:r)~Ií.
Inscrting this rclation iuto thc government buciget constraint yiclds the following ex-
1)retiaionti for th(~ ol)tilnal tiaviug alul output tax rateti,
Ilr.~(G -f-T) - cr(F(lí) - lí)
(5.11)
~( - tlerS f (p f (1 - cr)r.,,)(F(K) - lí)
aucl,
(P f(1 - a)c-„)(G f T) f nS (~
x - rlcrS -1- (p -F (1 - n)e„)(F(k) - h)
0.12)
Thc output tax, x, will always bc positivc iu (5.12). Analogously to Section 4, thc
saving tax, u, eul(í thc hlmp sunl trausfer, T, catlnot both b(, potiitivc. To investigatc,
whcn thcrc~ :lrc a positivc~ llunp sum ts:ulafcr allci a icro 9iLVlIlg tiLX, supposc that thc
govcrnlnetlt TCVCI1llC rcquiretncnt, G, is miuirnal, so that it cazl easily be covered by a small
output tax. The marginal cost (in privatc utility tcrnls) of introducing a small output
tax is UZ(1 -(r), eu it docs uot c115tOCt II1V(".titlIlent activity. With a anlall enough revenuc
requirelIlCllt, the IllilrglIlal cost of public funcls therefore remain, bclow Ul. Accordingly,
thc govol'íllIl(~llt 5houlci 1llcr(:iLti(: Eíle output t.:ucation further so .1., to finatlcc a lump sutn
transfcr to clomestic citizens. The optimal sire of this trallsfer is given by the equality
between the marginal cost of public funcls, ~, .md second period marginal utility, U2. At
such an optinlum, there is no scope for a saving tax.is
Froln (~(tuatiou (5.11), tlx` lluup ~unl trausfi,r th[~n equ:tls,
T - a(F(K) - k ) - G
n(-~






Alteruativcly, with a snffic-icntly high govcrnnlent revenue reqnirement, both output ancí
saviug ttlxatiou will be utilii(xí, atl(1 tllcre will optinlally bc no luuLl) slun transfer to the
privat.e sector. The optimal tax rates in this situation can bc read off expressions (5.11)
alld (5.12) with T set cqual to zcro.
WC til1lll llp dS fO110Wti,
PROPOSITION 5. Suplx)sc tltat thc profits tax rate ecpttLls thc rate of iuvesttnent taxatiou
tio that cffcctiwily output uud saving c:ul bc t:Lxcd. Thcu tlta optim:Ll ratc of output
to-ucation is always positivc. With tiottx~ forcign owucrship of domcstic firms, a sufficicntly
tiIIlall g()V('.runlcut r(`VeIlll(: I'(`(}lllr(:nlent will lca(1 tu a icro tiaviug t:ix allcí a positivc lump
sum trantifcr to thc (lotuctitic ~niv:Ltc s(xtor. Largrr vallleti of th(` };ovcrnlnent revc-nu[,
requirenlcnt will, however, intply a positivc saving tzuc :uld no lunlp sum traltsfer.
Thr. a6.~(~nr.r, af fnrcign .voxrr,r. inr.nmr, taxation
So f.u, w(~ havc assumcd that th(` country's taxation of its citiic~us' forcign source incomc
is fca.siblc. As is wcll-kuown, this tL.tisutltption may not bc realistic, :~ti nnlch foreign-source
income in practice gexw wholly or partly untaxecl. When foreign-source incomc taxation is
uot enforccablc, thc literaturc (s(x~, c.g., R.arin aucl Sadlca. (1991)~ prescribes that a stnall
open ecouotuy abstain from :uly resiclencc~-bll.u~eí t:ixr.s.
With t}11S 1I3 mlll(l, we catl exanliue a situation where the clotnetitic'. tax authority catt-
not, tax its citircns' for(~ign-tiollrcc iucomc, Whll(` (I()Iilestic inventlncnt :uld profits remain
taxablc. Thc saving tax uow effcctivcly no lougcr (~xints, whic`.h iti to say that u is set to
rcro.
If profits arc` fully trucc~(1 :~ti in Catic I, an inabilit,y to tax savings clcx:s not affect thc
(`arlicr ratilllt that :ul invcytulent. tax shoulcí uot b(, usc(1. An abticucc of thc saving tax,
of conry(`, ckx`s afïrct thc govornnlc`nt'ti (`ffi`ctivc capacity to raisc t,ix rcvcnu(~s. If profits
catlnot bc t:Lxed fully i4ti lI1 C:LSC II, thcn thc IL(IIl-iLV}Lllability of t.hc saving t:Lx is of no
cousequcncc cithcr in ca5c II(a), whcrc thc optim:Ll savings tax iti zcro anyway. In this
instancc, th(~ optim.Ll trallsf(,r, T, .w(l the optinuLl inv(~stulent t:Lx, v, t~ti b(.~fore are given
by equations (4.7) and by (4.8). In Cit.tiC II(b), huwover, thc optilual saving tax rate, iffcasiblc, iti po,itivc. In thc abticncc of x,xving ta, thc iuvcatnlcut tax i, left to carry the~
rc5iciual tax burclcn :Iftcr filll usc of thc prufit, tux. lu thiv instanc(~, thC lI1V('titlIleut tax,
v ia givcn by
C - z[F(Ií) - (1 f r)Ií]
(5.15) v - h(I - y)
Wc auuunariic our resultti ati follow5,
PROPOSITION 6. Suppotic that forcign aourcc incomc caztnot bc t.uccd aud that thc
t.ucatiou of prufitti iti inconlplctc. Iu thiti iustancc, thc itrvc~taucnt tax is part of the optiulal
t:ix paclGlge if doulewtic firulti :uc iu part forcign-owncci. Invctitulent t:uc revelules may or
Inay not be used to finance huup sum trallsfera to docncstic retiicícntti.
6. Conclusion
Thiti papcr hsLti cstabliyLccl that a r(lurcc-ba.u~cl capit:rl iucun)c tax iti not part of the
optimal taxation ticheme of a tiln:tll opeu econouly if profit. arc fillly taxable. In that
iuatancc, a residcucc-btLkccl incotllc t:tx on saviugs gcucrally iti w:Irr:wtccí. A colnbinatiou
of Source- ancí residence-b.r.ticcl capit.a incolnc taucc5 ulay be optilnal if profits are not fully
tauced. In that iutitance, sourcc-bawxl II1Vl:4tI11(,Ilt teixc, tnay rrven b(, uticcí to fin:ulce lump
tium tralltifcrs L() (1(rilletitl(' I'(~tii(1clltti.
Thc profits tax in this papcr can bc intcrprctccl :LV a tax on })ur(~ }Irofits gcneratcd by
prochletion uneler cíecrcasing return5 to ticslll`. Alt[:I'IliltlV(',ly, thc profit:s tax can be seen
a.5 a tax ou laucí or on iucl.I.titically tictppliecl labor. Fiually, thc profitn t:wc can be s(~en to
apply to public gooclti tiucll a.ti iufratitructnrc thut cuhancc privatc pro(luction. Thc profit5
away:; arc to bc taxecí to thc Slllctit cxtcnt if thc profitti tax cocxista with cíistortionary
capital incolne taxcti. The sourec:-bi4ti(:(1 lIlVeatlucnt tauc c.ul bc ticen :~ti au iudirect methocl
of taxiug profits. Ati a result, wc show that thc optilnal sonrec~-b:Lticcl income tax increases
with thc extcut of forcign clwncrshill of thc firulti' profits strcatn.
The analysiti of thi, paper Inay Lclp explaiu wlcy all developecl countrics simultancously
apply both tiource-based corp(Irate iucoule t.ixeti .uld retiicíence-b:L,c(1 pcraonal intcrest and
clividencl tacs at (~tatutory) ratev wcll above zeru. In ensence, nucu'c'c-basecí taxes su'e
cxplaiuccl .~~: an indircct II1CKIlti to t:Ix prufita, uot thc lcast thotic accruing to foreign
citizens. Other contributions intitcad llave expl~unecí the existoncc of corporate income
taxcti :tv an attcnlpt to couutcract thc poanibiliticti of incoluc ,hifting bctwcx,u pcrsonxl
ancl curporatc tax brLSCS vr intcrjurisdictioual incoluc tihifting by tirluti (~ec, in p.u'ticular,
Gordon and Mackie-M:~wn (1993)).
In future work, it Inay be interesting to enclugeIll'LC the governuleLL Il(Y;(1 fOr L'dX rCVf.I1llCS,
for in:;tance, by introducing public goods. It tuay a1w be interesting to íntroduce elasticallyix
supplied labor allcl to investigate the acope for inv(~yttnent taxes if labor is constrained to
be taxed at a low rate. Finally, it may be of interest to examine capital income taxation in
a two-c.ountry model wherr. countrics call affect the international intere:st rate. The results
presenteci in this paper ara expccted tu carry over to thesc morc gencral settings.
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